I. Introduction and Issues
This paper investigates the returns to prebuyout bondholders in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). These returns show (1) whether such events and their associated increases in leverage decrease bondholders' wealth and (2) how effectively various covenants protect bondholders. This paper also investigates whether bondholder losses are an important source of stockholder gains in LBOs.
The sources of significant wealth increases to prebuyout stockholders in LBOs [see DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Rice (1984) , DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1987) , Lehn and Poulsen (1988) , Kaplan (1989) and Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) ] have been the subject of considerable research. Real operating improvements in LBOs are documented by Kaplan (1989) and Smith (1989) , while Kaplan (1988) and Schipper and Smith (1988) find evidence of reduced corporate taxes. Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that wealth is transferred from existing employees. A comprehensive investigation of wealth transfers from other securityholders by Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) finds no loss for any class of securityholders, including bondholders.
Marais, Schipper, and Smith's finding that existing bondholders do not lose in LBOs is contested by anecdotal evidence in McDaniel(1986 McDaniel( , 1988 and the financial press, as well as by Warga and Welch (1990) . Furthermore, Jensen and Smith (1985) and Galai and Masulis (1976) predict negative redistribution effects with increasing leverage and Masulis (1980) finds negative bondholder returns in debt-for-equity exchange offersl. It is possible, of course, that any redistribution effects in LBOs are canceled by the bondholders' share of any real gains, by transfers from other sources, or by the existence of protective covenants. This paper's results differ from those of Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) . On average, existing bondholders suffer significant losses in LBOs. This result is not universal, however, and covenant protection explains much of the differences in bondholder wealth effects. Bonds with strong covenant protection gain value whereas those with weak or no protection lose value. What happens to bonds after buyouts--whether they remain outstanding, are called, are defeased, or are tendered for--is also strongly linked to the type of covenant protection.
Finally, wealth gains and losses to bondholders are small in comparison with the total gains accruing to shareholders in the same LBOs.
These results, besides confirming the existence of wealth redistribution effects and the importance of bond covenants, are also important in light of two recent developments in the public bond market. The first is the introduction of new protective covenants (such as poison puts) in bond indentures to protect bondholders from events such as mergers and leveraged buyouts. The second development, which we document in this paper, is a decline in traditional bond covenants after 1980. Since strong traditional covenants protect bondholders from wealth losses in LBOs, the declining use of such covenants in the 1980s and the introduction of new covenants seem anomalous.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the data and methodology, section 3 details covenant protection, section 4 presents the results and implications, and section 5 presents conclusions.
II. Sample Selection and Sources of Data
The 214 bonds analyzed here represent all publicly traded, nonconvertible In addition, announcements are collected using the annual Wall Street Journal Index and the ABI Database of periodical abstracts. Finally, the samples of LBOs used in Kaplan (1989) and Lehn and Poulsen (1988) are cross-checked for additional buyouts.
This sample of buyouts from 1980-1988 is screened by the following selection criteria:
(1) The proposed buyout involves the purchase of the entire equity of a publicly traded firm by a private buyout group or privately held firm, with the intent of taking the target firm private. There were 351 such buyout proposals;
(2) The total equity value of the proposed buyout exceeds $100 million; and (3) The target firm has at least one outstanding issue of a publicly traded, nonconvertible (and nonusable) debt security issued either by the target itself or by a wholly owned subsidiary.
Sixty-five buyout proposals meet these criteria, and the target firms have 214 outstanding publicly traded debt issues. The total par value of debt outstanding immediately prior to the buyout proposals is $16.4 billion. Of the 65 proposals, 47 result in a successful private buyout by either the original or a subsequent bidder. The 47 targets have 149 public bonds outstanding with a par value of $13.2 billion. 
III. Protective Covenants
Several categories of bond covenants may be violated in a buyout. The most important are (1) restrictions on subsequent financing that limit total debt and new debt of equal and/or higher priority; (2) restrictions on dividend payments that limit cash dividends as a proportion of current and retained earnings, and possibly apply to stock repurchases; and (3) restrictions on merger activity that limit net worth changes in mergers, which may be relevant if the target firm is acquired by a new buyout entity.
If a bond is protected by a covenant that is violated by the buyout, the bonds must be called or repurchased or the bondholder must otherwise be compensated before the buyout can proceed. If a protected bond is trading at a discount, a call or forced repurchase may result in a gain for the bondholders. To analyze the effect of covenants on bondholder wealth, we categorize relative bond protection in three ways: strong, weak, and no protection. These classifications are not precise, as we discuss later, but are an attempt to classify ex ante protection. The classification determines only whether the bond is protected by certain covenants. It does not indicate the strength of individual covenants, such as the level of debt that triggers a violation.
We classify as having strong protection (1) all bonds with a net worth restriction on the surviving firm in a merger, and (2) all bonds that limit total funded debt. For this group of covenants a buyout usually results in a violation, requiring the bond to be retired or its terms improved. We also include under strong protection all bonds secured before the buyout by a mortgage, lien, or defeasance. There should be little wealth redistribution from these bonds.
We classify as having weak protection bonds that have none of the strong protection covenants but have covenants (1) limiting senior funded debt, or (2) restricting dividends or special payouts to shareholders from retained earnings.
The type and amount of financing used in the buyout usually determine whether a covenant is violated for this group of bonds. Use of the high-yield subordinated bond market may allow buyouts that don't activate these weak covenants. In addition, most of the payout restrictions contain a ceiling based on the sum of retained earnings since the bond was issued. Thus, for profitable firms, the protection this covenant affords may erode over time.
Finally, bonds classified as having no protection are those with none of the covenants discussed above. These bonds may still have a restriction against issuing additional secured debt, but this restriction offers little protection in practice, since most buyouts are financed by unsecured debt.
Predicting which covenants will be violated is difficult at the buyout One-month, four-month, and entire-buyout period average abnormal bond returns are calculated. The one-month abnormal returns are for the period from the monthend preceding the buyout announcement until the end of the announcement month.
The four-month abnormal return is for the period from the month-end two calendar months preceding an announcement until the month-end two calendar months after the announcement month. The four-month abnormal return may more completely capture the initial market reaction to an event if bonds are infrequently traded.
The entire-period abnormal return is for the period from the month-end two months before the announcement until the month end two months after the LBO bid is either successfully completed or withdrawn. Table 2 gives the one-month, four-month, and entire-period average abnormal bond returns and the percentage of bonds with negative abnormal returns for buyout announcements. The average abnormal returns (in absolute value) reported here are larger than any previously published abnormal bondholder returns. The one-month average abnormal return for the entire sample is -1.1%, the four-month average abnormal return is -2.2%, and the entire-period abnormal return is -2.0%.
IV.1 All Buyouts: Successful and Unsuccessful
The standard errors are .4%, .6%, and .7%. The percentage of bonds with negative abnormal returns is 60.3% for one month abnormal returns and 66.7% for four month abnormal returns. The entire-period negative percentage is 57.4%.
The standard errors reported in the paper are cross-sectional, because the lack of bond prices over long periods makes calculating time-series standard errors impractical. Calculating statistical significance for the abnormal returns is also a problem because many firms have multiple bonds outstanding. This means that many of the bond returns are probably not independent of one another. This problem is addressed later in the paper when results are presented by buyout and not by bond. Finally, the length of the entire period varies from buyout to buyout. Table 2 shows that covenant protection is important in explaining wealth effects on bondholders of buyout announcements. The average entire-period abnormal returns are +2.6% for strong covenant protection, -0.7% for weak protection, and -5.2% for no protection. Standard errors are 1.1%, 1.6%, and 1.1%. Only 28.6% of the abnormal returns are negative for the strongly protected sample whereas 73.9% are negative for the unprotected sample.
The differences in Table 2 between the entire period and the one-month and four-month abnormal returns for all protection levels highlight the point that the market's initial reaction is not necessarily complete or accurate. At the time of announcement, the abnormal returns are only a probabilistic estimate of the total wealth effect of a buyout. Other information on the bid and on counterbids is released following the announcement. For example, for 14 bonds, the buyout is terminated and a merger announced before the end of the first month. This means that the one-month return of +1.6% for these bonds presumably reflects the wealth effects associated with the merger and not the announced (and subsequently cancelled) buyout. This problem of incomplete information at announcement suggests that the entire buyout period abnormal returns may more accurately reflect the effect of buyouts and covenant protection on bondholder wealth than the one-or four-month returns.
IV.2 Unsuccessful Buvouts
No buyout is completed for 18 proposals representing 65 bonds. For 53 of these bonds another event occurs; either a merger (13 proposals,35 bonds), a leveraged recapitalization (1 proposal, 7 bonds), or a liquidation of the firm (1 proposal, 11 bonds). The results for these bonds are similar to previous findings on bondholder returns in nonbuyouts. The one-month, four-month and entire-period abnormal returns for this sample are close to zero for most time periods and outcomes except liquidation. The percentage negative follows a similar pattern, with percentages close to 50% for all nonbuyout events and periods. For mergers the entire-period abnormal returns are -0.3% and the percentage negative is 54.8%, similar to the returns reported in Kim and McConnell(1977) , Asquith and Kim(1982) , and Dennis and McConnell(1988) .
IV.3 Successful Buvouts
The initial or a subsequent buyout proposal is completed for 47 target firms representing 149 bonds. The abnormal returns for these bonds are generally slightly larger in absolute value than those reported for the entire sample in Table 2 . The one-month, four-month, and entire-period abnormal returns for all bonds in completed buyouts are -1.7% , -3.7%, and -2.8% (standard errors are 0.4%, 0.6%, and 0.8%). The average entire-period returns for strongly protected bonds are +2.1% (standard error 1.7%) and -2.0% and -5.3X for weak and unprotected bonds (standard errors 2.0% and 1.2%). Over the entire-period more than 73% of the bonds with no covenant protection have negative abnormal returns, whereas only 28% of the strongly protected bonds do. These results strengthen the conclusion that covenant protection has an important impact on bondholders' wealth.
The results for successful buyouts also demonstrate a puzzling reversal of the average abnormal return and percentage negative for strongly protected bonds between the four-month announcement period and the entire period. The four-month abnormal return for 15 strongly protected bonds is -4.6% (80.0% negative) and the entire-period abnormal return is +2.1% (26.7% negative). One possible explanation is that some bondholders do not fully understand their bond's covenant protection and sell immediately after the buyout announcement. In a thin market, which exists for many of the bonds, a few trades could generate the reported returns.
The results above contrast with those presented in Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) . Their two-day announcement abnormal return is -0.03% and their return from after the announcement until completion is -1.0%. Neither result is statistically significant. Two reasons for the difference from our results seem to be the importance of covenant protection and our larger sample. Marais, Schipper, and Smith, briefly consider covenant protection when determining the disposition of debt after a buyout, but use only one covenant and find no apparenu effect for public bonds. They do not subsequently categorize bondholder returns by covenant protection, a distinction our results show is vital. Their sample also consists of fewer bonds, 30 to our 214, and only ten of their bonds are followed until completion in successful buyouts. This is primarily because they evaluate an earlier period (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) with fewer LBOs.
When we limit our sample to 1980-1985 we obtain the following results: for 48 bonds in successful buyouts the one-month abnormal return is -0.1% (standard error 0.7%), but the four-month and entire-period abnormal returns are -2.8% (standard error 1.0%) and -3.1% (standard error 1.8%). Thus our results are still large and negative even in the pre-1986 period. Our sample is almost five times as large as the ten bonds in Marais, Schipper, and Smith for the period until completion. Furthermore, the distribution of covenant protection for their sample is uncertain. If half of their ten bonds are strongly protected, this alone could explain their small and insignificant results. Marais, Schipper, and Smith do find that their distribution of returns has an unusually high variance, a result consistent with our findings on different covenants.
Warga and Welch (1990) also examine abnormal returns to bondholders in buyouts and find one-month and four-month abnormal returns of -1.2% and -6.0%
Their study covers the period January 1985 -April 1989. When we limit our sample period to 1985-1988, our one-month and four-month abnormal returns are -2.3% and -3.5%. Again the difference may be due to sample size and covenant protection.
Our sample is 103 bonds, whereas Warga and Welch's varies from 43 to 25. Also, we do not know the distribution of covenant protection in their sample since they do not consider covenants.
IV.4 Successful Buyouts: Bond Outcomes Table 3 presents evidence on the effects of covenant protection on bond outcomes. The 171 bonds for which the prospectuses are available are classified by protection level and by individual covenants. Also included are the outcomes for all bonds in successful buyouts. For example, of the 14 bonds classified as strongly protected, only four (28.6%) were still outstanding after the buyout.
Five of the 14 were called, four were tendered for, and one was defeased. For the 36 and 68 bonds classified as weak and not protected, the numbers (percentages) outstanding are 17 (47.2%) and 59 (88.1%). These results, and similar percentages when individual covenants are considered, strongly support the result that covenant protection affects bond outcomes. Unprotected bonds are much more likely to be left outstanding after a buyout.
Together with the abnormal returns reported in Table 2 , this is strong evidence that covenant protection, on average, does make a difference.
The results in sections IV.1 -IV.3 and unprotected bonds that were called, two had a pre-buyout price slightly above the call price and a third had a pre-buyout price above par. The other two had covenants restricting the issuance of new secured debt that were violated when the buyouts used secured bank financing. Table 4 demonstrates that the market distinguishes between bonds that will remain outstanding and those that will either be retired (through calls or tenders) or receive additional protection (through defeasance, through being 13 III secured by assets, or through renegotiation of the coupon rate. 
IV.5 Successful Buyouts: One Bond Per Buyout
Multiple bond returns from the same firm may not be independent. This creates problems of statistical inference as well as the possibility that the mean results reported above are biased by a few firms with many outstanding bonds. For example, RJR Nabisco had 20 bonds outstanding before its LBO, the most of any buyout. The average one-month, four-month, and entire-period abnormal returns for these bonds are -6.9%, -9.0%, and -7.3%. One way to correct for the statistical dependence of multiple bonds is to form each buyout's bonds into a portfolio. This is not practical, however, because different bonds in the same buyout can differ in covenant protection. There are twelve such successful buyouts; four with bonds classified as both strong and unprotected, six with bonds classified as weak and unprotected, and two with bonds classified as strong and weak. For the four buyouts with strong and unprotected bonds, all the unprotected bonds have a more negative abnormal return than the strongly protected bonds. The relationships between weak and unprotected bonds and strong and weak protection bonds within the same buyout are mixed.
Another way to calculate independent abnormal returns is to choose only one bond for each buyout. We select the one bond two ways, randomly, and by choosing the outstanding bond with the median time to maturity. Time to maturity should influence the market's reaction to bonds in buyouts, since the price of a bond about to mature will not be as strongly affected as one with a longer maturity, regardless of the level of covenant protection. The results from choosing one bond randomly from each successful buyout and the results from choosing the outstanding bond with the median time to maturity do not differ in any important way.
The results reported in Table 5 are from the sample with median time to maturity, and they are consistent with those reported above for the entire sample. The one-month, four-month, and entire-period abnormal returns are -1.3%, -3.2% and -4.9%. All these are statistically significant at the 1% level. The results in Table 5 categorized by covenant protection are also consistent with those reported above with entire period abnormal returns of +3.3%, -9.9%, and -7.6% for strong, weak, and no protection. The last two are significant at the 5% level. The percentages negative are 33.3%, 66.7Z, and 76.2% for strong, weak, and no protection. -This last percentage is significant at the 1% level for a binomial test on percentage of abnormal returns not equal to 50%. Finally, the pairwise t-statistics between strong covenant protection and both weak and no covenant protection are 2.97 and 2.96. These are both significant at the 1% level. The pairwise t-statistic between weak and no protection is 0.54, which is not significant. Thus, these results demonstrate that the returns reported above are not generated by a few buyouts with multiple bonds, and that bonds with strong covenant protection have significantly larger abnormal returns in buyouts than bonds with weak or no protection. 
IV.7 Stockholder and Bondholder Returns in Successful Buyouts
Abnormal returns for stockholders are calculated for the 47 successful buyouts in the sample by subtracting the change in the Standard & Poor 500 index from the change in stock price of the target firm. The resulting entire-buyout period average abnormal return is 37.9%. The sum of the entire period abnormal equity gain for the 47 target firms is $21,522 million and the corresponding total abnormal loss in value for publicly traded debt is $678 million. The total abnormal losses from preexisting public debt are 3.2% of the total abnormal stockholder gains.
If we assume that the value of total debt, public and private, on the balance sheet falls by a ratio equal to that for the total abnormal loss of the public debtholders, the abnormal loss to debtholders is $1,457 million, or 6.8% of the equity gain. This is probably an upper bound, however, since private debt usually contains stronger covenants than public debt. Further, in only one buyout are the bondholders' losses greater than the equityholders' gains. In fact, for 17 of the 47 successful buyouts the public debtholders gain value over the buyout period.
Finally, rank-order correlations between stockholder gains and bondholder losses show no significant relation. Thus, while wealth is redistributed from bondholders to stockholders on average, the effect is small and not universal among buyouts. This implies that debtholder losses are not a principal source of the large gains to stockholders in buyouts.
V. Conclusions
On average leveraged buyouts decrease prebuyout bondholders' wealth. The average entire buyout period return to bondholders of ultimately successful buyouts is -2.8%. This loss is large and is consistent with the view that increases in leverage redistribute wealth away from debtholders. These losses are not universal, however, and covenant protection affects both bond returns and outcomes. Bonds that contain covenants protecting against leverage increases or reductions in net worth through merger experience abnormal gains. Bonds that do not contain such covenants suffer abnormal losses.
Covenants also have a strong effect on the percentage of the bonds remaining outstanding after a buyout. Protected bonds are more likely than unprotected bonds to be retired (through call or tender), defeased, secured, or renegotiated. These outcomes and returns are related, with called bonds gaining +5.8% and bonds that remain outstanding losing -5.9% in successful buyouts.
Although covenant protection is important to bond returns and outcomes, the exact level of protection in any given buyout is difficult to determine. Even with strong covenant protection, bondholders suffer average abnormal losses in the month of and the four months surrounding the buyout announcement. Given the importance of covenants and the increase in LBOs during the 1980s, it is surprising that the percentage of bonds in our sample without covenants is substantially higher for bonds issued after 1980 than for those issued earlier.
Finally, wealth transfers from bondholders explain only a small fraction of the stockholder gains in buyouts. Bondholders in our sample incur abnormal losses of $678 million in successful buyouts, whereas stockholders earn abnormal gains of $21,522 million. Even if all debt, public and private, suffered similar losses, the total loss to debtholders would be less than 7% of the total gain to stockholders. 4. Of the 27 bonds called in our sample, only three had a price above the call price at the month end prior to the buyout announcement. Furthermore, these prices did not exceed the call price by much. The largest difference was a Cox Communication bond priced at 102.75 with a call price of 101.00.
5. We also regressed the entire-period abnormal return against years to maturity and dummies for levels of covenaut protection, with separate dummies for each firm. The firm dummies should capture firm-specific effects. In the regression the coefficient for years to maturity was negative and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for strong covenant protection was positive and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient for weak covenant protection was positive and insignificant. '00 .0P. 
